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Are football referees really biased and inconsistent? 
Evidence on the incidence of disciplinary sanction in the English Premier League 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In professional team sports with a high public profile, including association football (soccer), 
disciplinary transgressions by players and sanctions taken by referees provide a rich source of subject 
material for debate among pundits, journalists and the general public. Although newspaper and 
television pundits routinely and piously deplore incidents involving foul play or physical 
confrontation, there is no doubt that a violent incident, immediately followed by the referee’s 
theatrical action of brandishing a yellow or red card in the direction of the miscreant, makes an 
important contribution to the popular appeal of the football match as spectacle or drama.  
Due to the ever-increasing scope of television coverage of football especially at the highest 
level, together with improvements in video technology, the actions of players and referees have never 
been more keenly and intensely scrutinised than they are in the modern-day game. In sporting terms, 
the margins separating success from failure can be slender, and often depend ultimately on split-
second decisions taken by referees and players in the heat of battle. Yet the financial implications of 
success or failure for individual football clubs and their players can be huge. The football authorities 
are under intense pressure from all sides to take steps to ensure that refereeing decisions are as fair, 
consistent and accurate as is humanly possible. Bearing all of these considerations in mind, it is 
perhaps surprising that academic research on the incidence of disciplinary sanction in professional 
sports is relatively sparse. This paper seeks to fill this gap, by presenting a statistical analysis of 
patterns in the incidence of disciplinary sanction taken against players in English professional 
football’s highest division, the Premier League, over a seven-year period from 1996 to 2003.  
The empirical analysis addresses several questions concerning possible sources of home team 
bias or inconsistency in refereeing standards. The hypotheses investigated include: a home advantage 
hypothesis, that the tendency for away teams to incur more disciplinary points than home teams is 
solely a corollary of home advantage, or the tendency for home teams to win more often than away 
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teams; a refereeing consistency hypothesis, that the propensity to take disciplinary action does not 
vary between referees; and a time consistency hypothesis, that the incidence of disciplinary sanction is 
stable over time and unaffected by changes to the content or interpretation of the rules. We examine 
the extent to which the rate of disciplinary sanction against each team depends upon relative team 
quality. To what extent does it depend upon whether the match itself is competitive (between two 
evenly balanced teams) or uncompetitive? Does it depend upon whether end-of-season outcomes are 
at stake for either team? Is it affected by the stadium audience, and does it depend upon whether the 
match is broadcast live on TV? We aim to provide the football authorities and other parties with a 
firmer factual basis than has previously been available for debate and decisions concerning the 
interpretation and implementation of the rules governing disciplinary sanction in football.   
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous academic literature on 
the topic of disciplinary sanction in professional team sports. Section 3 identifies statistical 
distributions that may be regarded as candidates for modelling the incidence of disciplinary sanction 
in football: specifically, the univariate and bivariate Poisson and negative binomial distributions. 
Section 4 develops a theoretical analysis of the relationship between team quality and the incidence of 
disciplinary sanction. Section 5 reports estimations for the expectations of the incidence of 
disciplinary sanction conditional on a number of covariates, and reports a series of hypothesis tests 
concerning the sources of refereeing bias and inconsistency. Section 6 summarises and concludes.   
 
2. Literature review 
 
Previous academic scrutiny of the topic of disciplinary sanction in professional team sports 
has focused mainly on the impact of dismissals on match results; and on issues of incentives, 
monitoring and detection, which arise in the economics literature on crime and punishment. 
Ridder et al. (1994) model the effect of a dismissal on football match results, using Dutch 
professional football data from the period 1989-92. Probabilities are estimated for the match result 
conditional on the stage of the match at which a dismissal occurs. A method is developed for 
estimating the earliest stage of the match at which it is optimal for a defender to resort to foul play 
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punishable by dismissal in order to deny an opposing forward a goal scoring opportunity (conditional 
on the probability that the opportunity would be converted), assuming the defender’s objective is to 
minimise the probability of his team losing the match. In a multivariate analysis of the determinants of 
match results from the 2002 FIFA World Cup, Torgler (2004) also finds a significant association 
between player dismissals and match results.  
In the literature on the economics of crime and punishment, rule changes in professional 
sports have occasionally created opportunities for empirical scrutiny of the question whether 
increasing the resources assigned to monitoring or policing leads to an increase or a decrease in the 
incidence of crimes being detected. This incidence increases if the monitoring effect (more 
monitoring increases detection rates) exceeds the deterrent effect (the tendency for criminals to be 
deterred from offending because monitoring has increased).  
In North American college basketball’s Atlantic Coast Conference, an increase in the number 
of referees from two to three per match was implemented in 1979. McCormick and Tollison (1984) 
find that the number of fouls called per game fell sharply. If refereeing competence improved with the 
increase in the number of officials (with fewer fouls being missed), the actual crime rate must have 
decreased by even more than is suggested by the fall in the number of fouls called. 
In the North American National Hockey League (NHL), an increase from one to two referees 
per match was phased in during the 1998-9 and 1999-2000 seasons. Heckelman and Yates (2002) note 
that fouls detected are observed but fouls committed are unobserved. The difference between the two 
enters the error term of a regression for fouls detected when the latter is used as a proxy for fouls 
committed. Because this difference is likely to be correlated with the number of referees, instrumental 
variables are used to model the latter in the regression for fouls detected. Although more fouls were 
detected in NHL matches with two referees than in the matches with one, this appears to have been 
due solely to a monitoring effect. The incidence of fouls being committed was the same under both 
refereeing regimes. Distinguishing between violent and non-violent offences, Allen (2002) finds 
detection of the latter was significantly higher with two referees than with one. Again, this suggests 
the monitoring effect outweighs the deterrent effect. 
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As part of a wide-ranging investigation of the impact of changes in reward structures on effort 
using Spanish football data, Garciano and Palacios-Huerta (2000) draw comparisons between the 
numbers of yellow and red cards incurred before and after the introduction (in the 1995-6 season) of 
the award of three league points for a win and one for a draw. Previously two points had been 
awarded for a win and one for a draw. More yellow cards were awarded after the reward differential 
between winning and drawing was increased. This finding is consistent with theoretical models of 
tournaments, in which players can engage in sabotage activity. Following a rule change implemented 
at the start of the 1998-9 season requiring an automatic red card punishment for the tackle from 
behind, Witt (2005) finds evidence of an increase in the incidence of yellow cards (awarded for lesser 
offences), but no increase in the incidence of red cards. This finding suggests a deterrent effect was 
operative: football teams modified their behaviour in response to the rule change.  
There are some limitations to the statistical models and methods that have been employed in 
this literature. While McCormick and Tollison (1984) and Garciano and Palacios-Huerta (2000) 
estimate separate equations for the winning and losing teams, the other papers cited above report 
equations for the total number of offences called against both teams combined, factoring out many of 
the team-specific determinants of the incidence of disciplinary sanction. Despite the discrete structure 
of a ‘fouls’ or ‘cards’ dependent variable, McCormick and Tollison (1984) and Heckelman and Yates 
(2002) report ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Garciano and Palacios-Huerta (2000) discard 
univariate Poisson regressions in favour of OLS, because the former could not be estimated using 
fixed effects for teams. Witt (2005) reports both OLS and univariate Poisson regressions, while Allen 
(2002) uses a univariate negative binomial regression.  
Alleged refereeing bias in favour of the home team is a frequently-aired grievance on the part 
of managers, players and spectators, which has also received some attention in the academic literature. 
Garicano et al. (2001) and Sutter and Kocher (2004) find a tendency for referees to add more time at 
the end of matches when the home team is trailing by one goal than when the home team is leading. 
Nevill et al. (2002) played videotapes of tackles to referees who, having been told the identities of the 
home and away teams, were asked to classify the tackles as legal or illegal. One group of referees 
viewed the tape with the soundtrack (including crowd’s reaction) switched on, while a second group 
 5 
viewed silently. The first group were more likely to rule in favour of the home team, and the first 
group’s rulings were more in line with those of the original match referee. Using German Bundesliga 
data, Sutter and Kocher (2004) analyse reports on the referee’s performance, which comment on the 
legitimacy of penalties awarded and on cases of failure to award a legitimate penalty. There is 
evidence of home team bias in such decisions.  
 
3. Modelling the incidence of disciplinary sanction in English Premier League football 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the frequency distributions for the numbers of yellow cards and red 
cards incurred by the home and away teams in the N=2,660 Premier League matches played during 
the seven English football seasons from 1996-7 to 2002-3 inclusive. The data reported in Tables 1 and 
2 were originally compiled from match reports posted on the Football Association website, which 
have since been deleted. These data are available on request from the corresponding author. A yellow 
card, also known as a booking or caution, is awarded for less serious transgressions. There is no 
further punishment within the match, unless the player commits a second similar offence, in which 
case a red card is awarded and the player is expelled for the rest of the match (with no replacement 
permitted, so the team completes the match one player short). A red card, also known as a sending-off 
or dismissal, is awarded for more serious offences, and results in immediate expulsion (again, with no 
replacement permitted). After the match, a red card leads to a suspension, preventing the player from 
appearing in either one, two or three of his team’s next scheduled matches. A player who accumulates 
five yellow cards in different matches within the same season also receives a suspension.  
The dependent variables in the estimations reported in this paper are the total numbers of 
disciplinary ‘points’ incurred by the home (i=1) and away (i=2) teams in match j for j=1...N, denoted 
{Z1,j, Z2,j} and calculated by awarding one point for a yellow card and two for a red card. Only two 
points (not three) are awarded when a player is dismissed having committed two cautionable offences 
in the same match. This metric accurately reflects the popular notion that a red card is in some sense 
equivalent to two yellow cards. In fact, this notion was literally true of just under one-half of the red 
cards awarded during the observation period (227 out of 462 dismissals in total), which resulted from 
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two cautionable offences having been committed in the same match. Attempts to estimate versions of 
the model using separate yellow cards and red cards dependent variables were successful for the 
former but unsuccessful for the latter, presumably because the incidence of red cards is too sparse for 
reliable estimation. The results for estimations based on alternative metrics for the definition of the 
dependent variable, with red cards contributing either one point or three points, are similar to those 
reported below, and are available from the corresponding author on request. Table 3 reports the 
sample frequency distribution for {Z1,j, Z2,j}, with the rows and columns for Zi,j≥5 consolidated into a 
single row and a single column.  
In the applied statistics literature, several methods have been used to model professional team 
sports bivariate count data, where each match yields two values of a discrete dependent variable (one 
for each team: commonly the number of goals or points scored, but the disciplinary points dependent 
variable in the present case has the same structure). Maher (1982), Dixon and Coles (1997), Dixon 
and Pope (2004) and Goddard (2005) use the bivariate Poisson distribution to model English football 
goal scoring data, while Cain et al. (2000) use the univariate negative binomial distribution. Lee 
(1999) models Australian rugby league scores data using a bivariate negative binomial distribution.  
A description follows of the probability models that are considered as candidates for the 
disciplinary points dependent variables {Z1,j, Z2,j}. Let fi(zi)=P(Zi,j=zi) for zi=0,1,2,... denote the 
marginal probability function for Zi,j for i=1,2 and j=1...N. The two candidate distributions for fi(zi) 
are the Poisson, where fi(zi)=exp(–λi,j)
iz
j,iλ /zi!; and the negative binomial, where fi(zi)= 
ii z
ij,ij,iij,iiiiii )}/{{)}/()}]{(!z/{)z([ ρ+λλρ+λρρΓ+ρΓ
ρ
, and Γ denotes the gamma function. In 
both cases, E(Zi,j)=λi,j. For the Poisson, var(Zi,j)=λi,j. For the negative binomial, the ancillary 
parameter ρi>0 allows for overdispersion, such that var(Zi,j)=λi,j(1+κiλi,j), where κi=1/ρi. In the sample 
data, the degree of overdispersion is relatively small, but non-zero. The sample mean values of Z1,j 
and Z2,j are 1.4650 and 2.0451, and the sample variances are 1.7216 and 2.2657.   
For each of the Poisson and negative binomial specifications of fi(zi), three formulations of 
the bivariate probability distribution are considered, denoted P1-P3 and N1-N3. In P1 and N1, the 
joint probability function is the product of the two univariate probability functions, P(Z1,j=z1, 
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Z2,j=z2)=f1(z1)f2(z2). No allowance is made for correlation between Z1,j and Z2,j. Below, P1 and N1 are 
referred to as the double Poisson and the double negative binomial, respectively.  
In P2 and N2, the joint distribution function is constructed by substituting the two univariate 
distribution functions into the Frank copula, in accordance with Lee’s (1999) model for points-scoring 
in rugby union. Let Fi(zi) denote the univariate distribution functions for Zi,j corresponding to fi(zi). 
The bivariate joint distribution function is: 
 
G[F1(z1),F2(z2)] = 





−ϕ
−ϕ−ϕ
+
ϕ 1)exp(
}1)]z(F}{exp[1)]z(F{exp[
1ln
1 2211
   
 
The ancillary parameter ϕ determines the nature of any correlation between Z1,j and Z2,j. For 
ϕ<0 the correlation between Z1,j and Z2,j is positive, and for ϕ>0 the correlation is negative. 
G[F1(z1),F2(z2)] is undefined for ϕ=0, but it is conventional to write G[F1(z1),F2(z2)] = F1(z1)F2(z2) in 
this case. The bivariate joint probability function corresponding to G[F1(z1),F2(z2)] is obtained 
iteratively, as follows: 
 
P(Z1,j=0, Z2,j=0) = G[F1(0),F2(0)] 
P(Z1,j=z1, Z2,j=0) = G[F1(z1),F2(0)] – G[F1(z1–1),F2(0)]       for z1=1,2,...; j=1...N 
P(Z1,j=0, Z2,j=z2) = G[F1(0),F2(z2)] – G[F1(0),F2(z2–1)]       for z2=1,2,...; j=1...N 
P(Z1,j=z1, Z2,j=z2) = G[F1(z1),F2(z2)] – G[F1(z1–1),F2(z2)]  
– G[F1(z1),F2(z2–1)] + G[F1(z1–1),F2(z2–1)]     for z1,z2=1,2,...; j=1...N 
  
The construction of the bivariate Poisson or negative binomial distributions in P2 and N2 using the 
Frank copula requires some comment. As noted above, this method allows for unrestricted (positive 
or negative) correlation between Z1,j and Z2,j, depending on the ancillary parameter ϕ. In contrast, the 
standard bivariate Poisson distribution constructed by combining three random variables with 
univariate Poisson distributions, and several alternative formulations of the bivariate negative 
binomial distribution described by Kocherlakota and Kocherlakota (1992), are capable of 
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accommodating positive correlation only. In this case, the sample correlation between Z1,j and Z2,j is 
+0.2780. A positive correlation might reflect a tendency for teams to retaliate in kind if the opposing 
team is guilty of a particularly high level of foul play. Alternatively, a common opinion among 
pundits and supporters is that some referees, having penalised a player from one team, often look for 
an opportunity to penalise an opposing player soon afterwards, in an effort to pre-empt the formation 
on the part of managers, players or spectators of any perception of refereeing bias. 
Such explanations notwithstanding, there appears to be no compelling case for defining the 
bivariate distributions in a way that would exclude the possibility of obtaining a negative correlation. 
In Section 5, we comment briefly on the comparison between Model P2 fitted using the Frank copula, 
and an equivalent model fitted using the standard bivariate Poisson distribution. A further advantage 
gained by using the Frank copula to construct both of the bivariate (Poisson and negative binomial) 
distributions is that direct comparisons can be drawn between these two specifications in tests for the 
significance of the overdispersion parameters κ1 and κ2.  
In the third and final formulation of the bivariate distribution, P3 and N3 are obtained by 
applying a zero-inflated adjustment to the joint probabilities of P2 and N2, respectively. The zero-
inflated joint probabilities are P
~
(Z1,j=z1, Z2,j=z2) = (1–pi)P(Z1,j=z1, Z2,j=z2) + piD(z1,z2), where 
D(0,0)=1 and D(z1,z2)=0 for (z1,z2)≠(0,0), and pi is an additional ancillary parameter.  
Below, the probability models P1-P3 and N1-N3 are used in estimations of the unconditional 
and conditional expectations of the incidence of disciplinary sanction against the home and away 
teams. In the unconditional models, we assume λi,j=λi for i=1,2 and j=1...N. The probability models 
P1-P3 and N1-N3 are fitted directly to the sample data for {Z1,j, Z2,j}. In the conditional models, 
ln(λi,j) is specified as a linear function of a set of covariates. Although in principle it is possible to 
specify a conditional equation for the ancillary parameter ϕ as well, problems of non-convergence in 
the estimation were encountered if anything more than a very small number of covariates was used. In 
those estimations that did converge, the estimated coefficients in the equation for ϕ were insignificant.  
Two statistical procedures are used to assess the quality of the fitted models. First, a 
goodness-of-fit test is used to compare the observed and values of {Z1,j, Z2,j} in Table 3 with the 
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expected values obtained from each fitted model. For the unconditional estimations, a standard chi-
square goodness-of-fit test is employed. For the conditional estimations, the adaptation of this test 
described by Heckman (1982) is employed. In both cases, the distribution of the test statistic is χ2(25).  
The second procedure involves hypothesis tests of zero restrictions on the ancillary 
parameters of P2-P3 and N1-N3. Failure to reject any such restrictions suggests that the more 
complex specification can be discarded in favour of the simpler specification. The restriction ϕ=0 
implies P2 or N2 can be discarded in favour of P1 or N1. This restriction should not be tested using 
the z-statistic on ϕˆ  or a standard likelihood ratio (LR) test, because the bivariate distribution (defined 
using the Frank copula) is inapplicable when ϕ=0. However, the sample correlation between Z1,j and 
Z2,j reported above, together with indicators of the quality of the fitted models reported in Section 5 
such as the maximised values of the log-likelihood function, ln(L), and the goodness-of-fit tests, 
suggest the contribution of the parameter ϕ to the quality of the fitted versions of P2 and N2 is not in 
any doubt. The restriction κ1=κ2=0, which implies N3, N2 or N1 can be discarded in favour of P3, P2 
or P1, raises an issue for hypothesis testing discussed by Self and Liang (1987) and Andrews (2001). 
The values of κ1 and κ2  under the null hypothesis lie on the boundary of the relevant parameter space, 
so the standard regularity conditions fail to hold, and the standard LR statistic follows a non-standard 
distribution. The same issue arises in respect of the restriction pi=0, which implies P3 or N3 can be 
discarded in favour of P2 or N2. In each case, this issue is addressed by generating p-values based on 
Monte Carlo simulations of the sampling distribution of the LR statistic under the null hypothesis. For 
each test, the simulated data are generated from the probability model that is applicable under the null 
hypothesis, with all parameters set to the values that are obtained when this model is fitted to the 
sample data.  
  
4. Team quality and the incidence of disciplinary sanction 
 
In Sections 4 and 5, we develop an empirical model for the determinants of λi,j interpreted as 
the conditional expectations of the disciplinary points incurred by the home (i=1) and away (i=2) 
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teams in match j. In Section 4, we investigate the theoretical relationship between team quality and 
the incidence of disciplinary sanction. The aim of the theoretical analysis that follows is to derive an 
inverse relationship between the degree of uncertainty of match outcome, and the equilibrium levels 
of aggression contributed by both teams. Uncertainty of match outcome is a function of the variable 
qj, defined as a weighted sum of the home team’s win and draw probabilities for match j, qj = P(home 
win in match j)+0.5P(draw). A weighting of 0.5 is attached to the draw probability in order to ensure 
that qj and the equivalent weighted sum for the away team add up to one. Analysis of bookmakers’ 
odds and other statistical evidence suggests that the probability of a draw does not vary greatly from 
one match to another, and is not very sensitive to variations in the quality of the two teams (see, for 
example, Dobson and Goddard, 2001; Forrest et al., 2005). Therefore a convenient measure of 
uncertainty of match outcome is provided by qj(1 – qj): the product of qj and the equivalent weighted 
sum for the away team. This uncertainty of match outcome measure is maximised when qj=0.5.  
In the theoretical analysis, it is assumed that qj depends on: the talent differential between the 
two teams; a home advantage effect; and a tactical decision variable representing the level of 
‘aggression’ contributed by each team. Let ti,j and ai,j denote the playing talent and aggression level of 
team i in match j, respectively. ti,j and ai,j are scaled such that we can write qj = Φ[t1,j–t2,j+θ(a1,j)–
θ(a2,j)+h], where Φ is the standard Normal distribution function, h is a scalar that allows for home 
advantage, and θ is a continuous and twice-differentiable function, with θ'(ai,j)>0, θ"(ai,j)<0 for all ai,j. 
At low levels, more aggression enhances a team’s win probability. However, this relationship is 
subject to diminishing returns: beyond a certain point further aggression becomes counterproductive. 
For convenience, we shall write qj=Φ[xj+θ(a1,j)–θ(a2,j)], where xj=t1,j–t2,j+h.  
It is also assumed that aggressive play by either team imposes a cost, represented by a 
continuous and twice-differentiable function ν(ai,j), with ν'(ai,j)>0, ν"(ai,j)>0 for all ai,j. ν(ai,j) reflects 
the deleterious effect on future match results of player suspensions resulting from yellow or red cards 
awarded in the current match. ν(ai,j) is increasing in aggression, at an increasing rate as the level of 
aggression increases.    
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We assume both teams decide their own aggression levels independently and before the start 
of the match. We derive a Nash equilibrium for the aggression levels contributed by both teams. A 
distinction is drawn between this tactical decision concerning aggression, and any tendency to engage 
in foul play on a retaliatory or tit-for-tat basis once the match is underway. As discussed in Section 3, 
in the bivariate models this retaliatory effect is one of the factors captured by the parameter ϕ.  
At the Nash equilibrium, each team selects its own aggression level, conditional on the other 
team’s aggression level being taken as fixed at its current value. For example, consider team 1’s 
choice of a1,j, conditional on a2,j (and xj). Team 1 selects a1,j to maximise the objective function pi1(a1,j; 
a2,j, xj) = Φ[xj+θ(a1,j)–θ(a2,j)] – Φ[xj–θ(a2,j)] – ν(a1,j), representing the net benefit to team 1 of an 
aggression level of a1,j, rather than zero aggression. The maximisation of this objective function yields 
team 1’s reaction function, a1,j = r1(a2,j, xj). A similar optimisation procedure yields team 2’s reaction 
function, a2,j = r2(a1,j, xj). The Nash equilibrium {
*
j,1a , 
*
j,2a } is located at the intersection of the two 
reaction functions, at which point 
*
j,1a  = r1(xj, 
*
j,2a ) and 
*
j,2a = r2(xj, 
*
j,1a ).  
Figure 1 illustrates the Nash equilibrium for the three cases xj=0, 0.5, 1. The quadratic 
functional forms θ(ai,j)=ai,j–0.2ai,j
2
 and ν(ai,j)=0.2ai,j+0.1ai,j
2
 are used for illustrative purposes. The 
model is symmetric, so 
*
j,1a =
*
j,2a  for any xj, and the Nash equilibrium values for xj =–0.5, –1 are the 
same as those for xj=0.5, 1, respectively. The maximum numerical values for {
*
j,1a , 
*
j,2a } occur in the 
case xj=0 where, taking account of talent and home advantage, the teams are equally balanced with 
identical win probabilities, so qj=0.5. Figure 1 illustrates the following general property of the 
theoretical model: as the degree of competitive imbalance increases, the Nash equilibrium values 
{
*
j,1a , 
*
j,2a } decrease. If the match is evenly balanced, a little extra aggression by either team has a 
large effect on qj, and the aggression levels of both teams are high at the Nash equilibrium. 
Conversely, if the match is unbalanced, a little extra aggression by either team has a small effect on qj, 
and the aggression levels are low at the Nash equilibrium. 
In the empirical model, a numerical value for qj for each of the N=2,660 sample matches is 
generated from the ordered probit match results forecasting model developed by Goddard (2005). 
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This model generates probabilities for home win, draw and away win outcomes, based solely on 
historical data that is available prior to the match in question. The forecasting model’s covariates are: 
the win ratios of both teams over the 24 months prior to the current match; both teams’ recent home 
and away match results; dummy variables indicating the significance of the match for end-of-season 
outcomes (championship, European qualification and relegation); dummy variables indicating current 
involvement in the FA Cup; both teams’ recent average home attendances; and the geographic 
distance separating the teams’ home towns. To generate match result probabilities for each season 
(1996-7 to 2002-3 inclusive), seven versions of the forecasting model are estimated, using data for the 
preceding 15 seasons in each case. Full details of the forecasting model are reported in Goddard 
(2005) and are not repeated here.  
The empirical model allows for two forms of relationship between qj and the incidence of 
disciplinary sanction. First, a weaker team that is forced to defend for long periods can be expected to 
commit more fouls than a stronger team that spends more time attacking. This suggests a negative 
(positive) linear relationship between qj and the disciplinary points incurred by the home (away) team. 
Second, the theoretical analysis developed in Section 4 suggests there is also a non-linear dimension 
to the relationship between qj and the incidence of disciplinary sanction. In the empirical model, this 
is represented by the quadratic covariate qj(1 – qj). A positive relationship is expected between this 
covariate and the incidence of disciplinary sanction against both teams.  
 
5. Estimation results and tests for refereeing bias and inconsistency 
 
 Section 5 reports the estimation results for the unconditional and conditional expectations of 
the disciplinary points dependent variable. All estimations were carried out using the maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure in Stata 9.1. Summary estimation results based on probability models 
P1-P3 and N1-N3 are reported in Table 4.  
For the unconditional estimations reported in the upper panel of Table 4, in all cases the 
estimated values of the parameters λ1 and λ2 are the sample means of Zi,j, 1λˆ =1.4650 and 2λˆ =2.045. 
 13 
In the unconditional estimations, the inclusion of additional ancillary parameters invariably produces 
large improvements in the quality of the fitted model, according to both the goodness-of-fit test and 
the simulated p-values for the LR statistics. The bivariate Poisson distribution defined by fitting the 
Frank copula, P2, is also found to offer a marginal improvement over the model fitted the standard 
bivariate Poisson distribution (which is not reported in Table 4): the maximised values of the log-
likelihood function are ln(L)=–8753.4 for the former, and ln(L)=–8753.9 for the latter. In N3, the 
simulated p-values indicate that H0:pi=0 can be rejected (N3 is preferred to N2) and H0:κ1=κ2=0 can 
be rejected (N3 is preferred to P3). In the goodness-of-fit tests based on the unconditional estimations, 
N3 is the only specification for which the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 0.01 level. 
In the conditional estimations reported in the lower panel of Table 4, the ancillary parameter 
ϕ appears to produce a significant improvement in the quality of the fitted model (P2 and N2 
dominate P1 and N1, respectively). However, the improvements produced by the other ancillary 
parameters κ1, κ2 and pi are relatively small. Using simulated p-values, we fail to reject H0:κ1=κ2=0 in 
respect of N2 and N3. At the 0.01 level, we also fail (narrowly) to reject H0:pi=0 in P3. However, the 
goodness-of-fit test rejects the null in P2, but fails to do so in P3.  
On the balance of these results, we select P3, the zero-inflated bivariate Poisson, as our 
chosen probability model, to be used as the basis for the conditional estimations that are reported in 
full below, and the hypothesis tests that follow. In the unconditional estimations, the use of the 
negative binomial probability model (with a zero-inflated adjustment) is required to represent the 
overdispersion in the sample data for {Z1,j, Z2,j}. In the conditional estimations, however, the 
covariates appear to be largely successful in identifying the sources of overdispersion, rendering the 
use of the more complex negative binomial probability model unnecessary.  
In the rest of Section 5, we report the estimated model for the conditional expectations of the 
numbers of disciplinary points incurred by the home and away teams. In order to ensure the non-
negativity of the fitted values of λi,j, ln(λi,j) is used as the dependent variable. ln(λi,j) is assumed to 
depend on covariates that vary from match to match. The team quality covariates qj and qj(1 – qj) have 
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been described in Section 4. The remaining covariate definitions are shown below. Table 5 reports 
summary descriptive statistics for {Z1,j, Z2,j} and for all of the covariates. 
sigi,j =  0-1 dummy variable, coded 1 if match j is significant for end-of-season championship, 
European qualification or relegation outcomes, for the home (i=1) or away (i=2) team. 
DMi,m,j = 1 if match j falls within managerial spell m for the home (i=1) or away (i=2) team; 0  
otherwise (m=1...56 represents managerial spells that contained at least 30 Premier League 
matches within the observation period; the matches in 24 other spells that contained fewer 
than 30 matches in total form the reference category). 
DRr,j = 1 if match j is officiated by referee r; 0 otherwise (r=1...28 represents referees who officiated  
at least 30 Premier League matches within the observation period; nine other referees who 
officiated fewer than 30 matches each form the reference category). 
DSs,j = 1 if match j is played in season s; 0 otherwise (s represents seasons 1997-8 to 2002-3 inclusive;  
1996-7 is the reference category). 
attj   =  reported attendance at match j. 
skyj  = 1 if match j was televised live by BSkyB; 0 otherwise. 
  
The model specification allows for tests of several hypotheses concerning patterns in the 
incidence of disciplinary sanction. The principal hypotheses of interest are as follows:   
H1: The home advantage hypothesis. The tendency for away teams to incur more disciplinary 
points than home teams is solely a corollary of home advantage: the tendency for home teams to win 
more frequently than away teams. 
H2: The refereeing consistency hypothesis. The average incidence of disciplinary sanction 
does not vary between referees. 
H3: The consistent home team bias hypothesis. The degree to which away teams incur more 
disciplinary points than home teams on average (after controlling for home advantage) does not vary 
between referees.  
H4: The time consistency hypothesis. The average incidence of disciplinary sanction is stable 
over time. 
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H5: The audience neutrality hypothesis. The incidence of disciplinary sanction is invariant to 
the size of the crowd inside the stadium, and is the same notwithstanding whether the match is 
broadcast live on TV. 
 The estimated conditional equations for ln( j,1λˆ ) based on P3 are reported below as equations 
(5) and (6). z-statistics for the estimated coefficients, based on robust standard errors, are shown in 
parentheses (intercept and dummy variable coefficients are not reported). The estimation results are 
interpreted and discussed below. Robust inference is used throughout, in the tests of H1-H5. 
 
ln( j,1λˆ ) = 0,1αˆ – 0.6137 qj + 5.0195 qj(1 – qj) – 0.0122 sig1,j + 13.5467 attj + 0.0242 skyj 
              (–3.16)        (5.37)                    (–0.23)              (3.14)            (0.54) 
+ ∑β
=
6
1s
j,ss,1 DS
ˆ  + ∑δ
=
56
1m
j,m,im,1 DM
ˆ  + ∑γ
=
28
1r
j,rr,1 DRˆ       (5) 
ln( j,2λˆ ) = 0,2αˆ + 0.8557 qj + 3.0241 qj(1 – qj) + 0.1300 sig2,j +  1.9502 attj  + 0.0050 skyj 
                (3.40)         (3.75)                    (2.71)               (1.11)            (0.13) 
+ ∑β
=
6
1s
j,ss,2 DS
ˆ  + ∑δ
=
56
1m
j,m,im,2 DM
ˆ  + ∑γ
=
28
1r
j,rr,2 DRˆ       (6) 
 
Relative team quality and home advantage 
The specification of (5) and (6) defines a quadratic functional form for the relationship 
between qj and ln( j,iλˆ ). This relationship is parameterised so that the coefficients reported are for qj, a 
weighted sum of the home team’s win and draw probabilities after allowing for home advantage, and 
qj(1 – qj), a measure of competitive balance. In order to validate the assumed quadratic functional 
form, preliminary estimations of (5) and (6) were carried out with the terms in qj and qj(1 – qj) 
replaced by ten 0-1 dummy variables identifying observations with values of qj in the following 
bands: qj≤0.4, 0.4<qj≤0.44, 0.44<qj≤0.48, and so on until qj>0.76. Table 6 compares the estimated 
values for j,iλˆ  that are produced by the non-parametric (dummy variables) formulation and the 
parametric (quadratic) formulation, for the numerical values of qj located at the mid-points of the 
bands, and with all other covariates set to their sample means. Although there is some unevenness in 
the expected values obtained using the non-parametric formulation, the quadratic functional form 
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appears to provide a good approximation to the underlying shape of this relationship. The difference 
between the maximised values of the log-likelihood function, ln(L)=–8437.9 for the non-parametric 
formulation, and ln(L)=–8439.6 for the parametric formulation, is small. The quadratic functional 
form locates the maxima of j,1λˆ  and j,2λˆ  with respect to qj at qj=0.439 and qj=0.641, respectively.  
The home advantage hypothesis H1 asserts that the propensity for away teams to collect more 
disciplinary points on average than home teams is solely a corollary of the home advantage effect on 
match results. If so, the expected incidence of disciplinary sanction for a (relatively strong) away team 
should be the same as that for a (relatively weak) home team, if the two teams’ win probabilities 
(taking home advantage into account) are the same. Under H1, all coefficients in (5) should be 
identical to their counterparts in (6), except the coefficients on qj which should be equal and opposite 
in sign (because the weighted sum of the away team’s win probability and the draw probability is one 
minus this weighted sum for the home team, or 1 – qj). An implication of H1 is λ1,j–λ2,j=0 if qj=0.5,  
qj(1 – qj)=0.25, and all other covariates in (5) and (6) are set to their sample means. Alternatively,  
λ1,j–λ2,j<0 if qj is set to its sample mean ( q =0.6025) and qj(1 – qj)= )q1(q − =0.2395. Under H1, the 
observed difference between the average disciplinary points incurred by the home and away teams 
should be due solely to the home advantage effect (on average, the home team has a higher weighted 
sum of win and draw probabilities than the away team).  
For qj=0.5 the procedure described above yields j,2j,1
ˆˆ λ−λ = –0.285. The robust standard 
error, calculated using the delta method (Oehlert, 1992), is 0.061. For qj= q , this procedure yields 
j,2j,1
ˆˆ λ−λ = –0.585 (s.e.=.044). To check the robustness of these results, we also estimated (5) and (6) 
with all covariates and dummy variables other than qj and qj(1 – qj) excluded, and repeated the 
calculation. The results were similar: j,2j,1
ˆˆ λ−λ = –0.386 (s.e.=.048) for qj=0.5, and j,2j,1 ˆˆ λ−λ =  
–0.610 (s.e.=.044) for qj= q . In both cases, j,2j,1
ˆˆ λ−λ  is significantly less than zero for qj=0.5. 
Therefore the tendency for away teams to endure a higher incidence of disciplinary sanction cannot be 
explained solely by the home advantage effect, although this effect does contribute towards the 
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observed pattern. H1 is also rejected by a Wald test of the appropriate cross-equation equality 
restrictions on the coefficients of (5) and (6), which yields χ2(96)=171.5 (p-value=.0000).  
 
Other controls for team behaviour 
In order to isolate the contribution of referees to the variation in the incidence of disciplinary 
sanction, the conditional model includes a number of additional covariates that control for the effects 
of team behaviour. The contribution to the model of these controls is examined in this subsection.  
The incidence of disciplinary sanction for either team might be affected by the importance of 
the match for end-of-season championship, European qualification or relegation outcomes. A team 
that still has end-of-season issues at stake might be expected to be more determined or aggressive than 
a team with nothing at stake. In the definitions of the dummy variables sigi,j, the algorithm that 
determines whether a match is significant for either team assesses whether it is arithmetically possible 
(before the match is played) for the team to win the championship, qualify for European competition 
or be relegated, if all other teams currently in contention for the same outcome take one point on 
average from each of their remaining fixtures. Alternative algorithms, based on more optimistic or 
pessimistic assumptions concerning the average performance of competing teams over their remaining 
fixtures, alter the classification of a small proportion of matches at the margin, but the implications of 
such minor variations for the estimation results reported here are negligible. 
The coefficient on sig1,j in (5) is insignificant, but the coefficient on sig2,j in (6) is positively 
signed and significant at the 0.01 level. A possible interpretation is that away teams feel able to ‘ease 
off’ in unimportant end-of-season matches; but home teams, perhaps conscious of their own crowd’s 
critical scrutiny, feel obliged to demonstrate maximum commitment at all times, even when no end-
of-season issues are at stake.  
Differences between football teams in playing personnel, styles of play and tactics represent a 
further possible source of variation in the incidence of disciplinary sanction. With 22 players (plus 
substitutes) participating in every match, in an empirical analysis at match level it is impossible to 
control for every change of playing personnel. In preliminary experiments with the model 
specification, we encountered a tendency for estimations including separate dummy variables for each 
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team in each season to fail to converge, due to the excessive number of coefficients. Therefore we 
have chosen to use managerial spells as a proxy for football team-related factors that might produce 
differences in the incidence of disciplinary sanction. This can be justified on the grounds that 
managers are primarily responsible for tactics and playing styles. Casual observation suggests 
managerial change is a good proxy for turnover of playing personnel: the removal of a manager is 
often followed by high player turnover, as the new incumbent seeks to reshape his squad in 
accordance with his own preferences. A Wald test of H0:δi,m=0 for i=1,2 and m=1...56 in (5) and (6) 
yields χ2(112)=264.0 (p-value=.0000), suggesting that choices of personnel and tactics made by 
managers do have a highly significant effect on the incidence of disciplinary sanction. 
 
Individual referee effects 
Inconsistency in the standards applied by different referees is among the most frequent causes 
of complaint from football managers, players, supporters and media pundits. Table 7 summarises the 
average numbers of disciplinary points per match awarded against the home and away teams and 
against both teams combined, by each of the 28 referees who officiated at least 30 Premier League 
matches during the observation period. (The data for a further nine referees who each officiated fewer 
than 30 matches are excluded from Table 7.) There appears to be considerable variation between the 
propensities for individual referees to take disciplinary action. For example, the most lenient referee 
(Keith Burge) averaged 2.526 disciplinary points per match over 57 matches, and the most prolific 
(Mike Reed) averaged 4.541 points over 85 matches.  
Does this degree of variation in the incidence of disciplinary sanction per referee constitute 
statistical evidence of inconsistency in refereeing standards? H2, the refereeing consistency 
hypothesis, imposes zero restrictions on the coefficients on the individual referee dummy variables 
DRr,j, which identify matches officiated by the 28 referees listed in Table 7. In (5) and (6), a Wald test 
of H0:γi,r=0 for i=1,2 and r=1...28 yields χ
2
(56)=171.3 (p-value=.0000). Therefore H2 is rejected, 
suggesting there was significant variation in standards between referees. Since the conditional model 
includes controls for team quality and other potential influences on the incidence of disciplinary 
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sanction, the rejection of H2 should not be attributable to any non-randomness in the assignment of 
referees to matches: for example, the tendency for referees with a reputation for toughness to be 
assigned to matches at which disciplinary issues are anticipated by the authorities. However, it is 
acknowledged that the use of 0-1 dummy variables to model the individual referee effects may 
represent a simplification: for example, it does not allow for duration dependence in referees’ 
performance, which might arise if referees modify their behaviour as they gain experience, or if the 
removal of unsatisfactory referees by the football authorities introduces a form of survivorship effect. 
The rejection of H1, the home advantage hypothesis, suggests there is a bias favouring the 
home team in the incidence of disciplinary sanction, even after controlling for home advantage in 
match results. With H2 also having been rejected, it is relevant to examine whether there are 
significant differences between referees in the degree of home team bias. In other words, do variations 
in the degree of home team bias on the part of different officials contribute to the observed pattern of 
refereeing inconsistency? H3, the consistent home team bias hypothesis, imposes the restriction that 
the corresponding coefficients on the individual referee dummy variables in the home and away team 
equations are the same. H3 would imply that the rate at which away teams tend to incur more 
disciplinary points than home teams does not vary between referees. In (5) and (6), a Wald test of 
H0:γ1,r=γ2,r for r=1...28 yields χ
2
(28)=52.21 (p-value=.0036). Therefore H3 is rejected at a significance 
level of 0.01 (but not at a significance level of 0.001).  
 
Season effects 
The individual football season dummy variables DSs,j are included in the conditional model 
primarily as a control for changes over time in the content and interpretation of the rules relating to 
the award of yellow and red cards. The key changes during the observation period are detailed in 
Table 8. Most of the changes have increased the range of offences that are subject to disciplinary 
sanction, although there has occasionally been movement in the opposite direction.  
Table 9 reports the average numbers of yellow and red cards awarded against the home and 
away teams per match by season. There appears to be little or no trend in the overall incidence of 
disciplinary sanction, despite the increase in the range of sanctionable offences. Two possible 
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explanations are as follows. First, whenever there is an addition to the list of sanctionable offences, 
players may modify their behaviour so that the numbers of cautions and dismissals remain 
approximately constant (Witt, 2005). Second, referees may tend to modify their interpretation of the 
boundaries separating non-sanctionable from sanctionable offences, and those separating cautionable 
from dismissable offences, so as to maintain an approximately constant rate of disciplinary sanction.  
The directive issued at the start of the 1998-9 season making the tackle from behind 
punishable by automatic dismissal is the only rule change that appears to have had a discernible 
impact on the data summarised in Table 9. The mean incidence of disciplinary sanction is higher for 
1998-9 than for any of the other six seasons in the observation period. Within the 1998-9 season as 
well, the process of adjustment to the new disciplinary regime is visible in the data: during the first 
three months of this season the average disciplinary points incurred by both teams per match was 
4.336, while the average for the rest of the season was 3.883 (see also Witt, 2005). In subsequent 
seasons, although this directive remained in force, the incidence of disciplinary sanction returned to 
levels similar to those experienced before the directive came into effect. 
In order to test H4, the time consistency hypothesis that the average incidence of disciplinary 
sanction is stable over time, the null hypothesis (expressed in terms of the coefficients of the 
conditional model) is H0:βi,s=0 for i=1,2 and s=1997-8 to 2002-3 (inclusive). A Wald test yields 
χ2(12)=34.34 (p-value=.0006), suggesting there was significant season-to-season variation in the 
incidence of disciplinary sanction. However, if the zero restrictions on the coefficients for 1998-9 are 
excluded from the null (H0:βi,s=0 for i=1,2 and s=1997-8 and 1999-2000 to 2002-3 inclusive), the 
Wald test yields χ2(10)=12.56 (p-value=.2491). This suggests that with the (temporary) exception of 
the 1998-9 season, there was no other significant season-to-season variation in the incidence of 
disciplinary sanction. H4 receives qualified support from the estimation results. 
 
Match attendance and live TV broadcast 
Under H5, the audience neutrality hypothesis, the incidence of disciplinary sanction is 
unaffected by the crowd inside the stadium, and is also the same notwithstanding whether the match is 
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being broadcast live on TV. To control for crowd effects, the covariate attj, defined as the reported 
attendance at match j, is included in the regressions for ln(λi,j). If H5 is not supported in respect of the 
stadium audience, more than one prior concerning the direction of any effect is possible. A large 
attendance might be expected to add to the intensity or excitement of the occasion, resulting in more 
determined or aggressive play by either or both teams. Alternatively, a large attendance, presumably 
dominated by supporters of the home team, might put pressure on the referee to treat disciplinary 
transgressions by the home team more leniently, and those by the away team more severely.  
The coefficient on attj in (5) is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. The equivalent 
coefficient in (6) is also positive, but insignificant. With respect to the stadium audience H5 is 
rejected, but there is no evidence of any tendency for referees to treat the home team more leniently 
when the crowd size is larger; if anything, the opposite seems to apply.  
The satellite broadcaster BSkyB held the Premier League’s live TV broadcasting rights 
throughout the observation period. These rights permitted BSkyB to screen between 60 matches per 
season (at start of the observation period) and around 100 (by the end). The total number of scheduled 
Premier League matches per season is 380. If H5 is not supported, a tendency for players or referees 
to ‘play to the camera’ might be discernible in a different incidence of disciplinary sanction between 
televised and non-televised matches. However, both coefficients on skyj in (5) and (6) are positive but 
insignificant. Therefore H5 is supported in respect of the live TV audience, with no evidence that the 
behaviour of players or referees is affected when the match is broadcast live on TV. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have reported estimations for the unconditional and conditional expectations 
of the incidence of disciplinary sanction against footballers in English Premier League matches. A 
comprehensive statistical analysis of patterns in the award of yellow and red cards over a seven-year 
period aims to provide the football authorities and other interested parties with a firmer factual basis 
than has been available previously for policy decisions and debate concerning the interpretation and 
implementation by referees of the rules governing disciplinary sanction in professional football.   
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In the estimations of the conditional expectations of the numbers of disciplinary points 
incurred by the home and away teams, it is found that relative team strengths matter: underdogs tend 
to incur a higher rate of disciplinary sanction than favourites. The incidence of disciplinary sanction 
tends to be higher in matches between evenly balanced teams, in matches with end-of-season 
outcomes at stake, and in matches that attract high attendances. Home teams appear to play more 
aggressively in front of larger crowds, but perhaps surprisingly the crowd size does not influence the 
incidence of disciplinary sanction against the away team. There is no evidence that the behaviour of 
players or referees is any different in live televised matches.   
Despite an increase over time in the number of offences subject to disciplinary sanction, there 
was no consistent time-trend in the yellow and red cards data: players and officials appear to have 
adjusted to changes in the rules so that in the long run the rate of disciplinary sanction remained 
approximately constant. Individual referee effects make a significant contribution to the explanatory 
power of the conditional model, indicating that there are inconsistencies between referees in the 
interpretation or application of the rules. An obvious but important policy implication for the football 
authorities is that steps need to be taken in order to improve refereeing consistency.  
The empirical analysis suggests that the tendency for away teams to incur more disciplinary 
points than home teams cannot be explained solely by the home advantage effect on match results. 
Even after controlling for team quality, a (relatively strong) away team can expect to collect more 
disciplinary points than a (relatively weak) home team with the same win probability. Therefore the 
statistical evidence seems to point in the direction of a home team bias in the incidence of disciplinary 
sanction. This interpretation is consistent with evidence of home team bias in several other recent 
studies, which find that the home team is favoured in the calling of fouls, or in the addition of 
stoppage time at the end of matches. Finally, evidence is found of variation between referees in the 
degree of home team bias; and this variation contributes to the overall pattern of refereeing 
inconsistency. These findings suggest that while all referees should be counselled and encouraged to 
avoid (presumably unintentional) home team bias in their decision-making, the extent to which 
corrective action is required is also likely to vary between officials. 
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1 Observed numbers of yellow cards incurred by the home and away teams,   
  English Premier League, seasons 1996-7 to 2002-3 
 
 Away team 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total Home team  
0 189 254 158 86 35 9 1 0 732 
1 110 260 264 147 66 23 6 1 877 
2 64 162 158 126 47 25 6 1 589 
3 18 77 96 72 39 14 3 4 323 
4 3 13 29 32 16 8 2 0 103 
5 1 3 12 11 2 1 0 1 31 
6 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 5 
Total 385 769 718 476 206 81 18 7 2660 
 
Source: The Football Association. 
 
 
 
Table 2 Observed numbers of red cards incurred by the home and away teams, 
  English Premier League, seasons 1996-7 to 2002-3 
 
 Away team 
0 1 2 Total Home team  
0 2258 231 8 2497 
1  119 34 3 156 
2     2 3 0 5 
3     2 0 0 2 
Total 2381 268 11 2660 
 
Source: The Football Association. 
 
 
 
Table 3 Sample frequency distribution for the bivariate disciplinary points dependent 
variable, {Z1,j,Z2,j} 
 
 Z2,j 
Z1,j 0 1 2 3 4 5+ Total 
0 182 235 141 84 45 18 705 
1 104 244 238 137 66 49 838 
2 65 150 140 121 51 57 584 
3 17 71 92 73 48 34 335 
4 4 18 35 42 18 16 133 
5+ 2 7 17 20 10 9 65 
Total 374 725 663 477 238 183 2660 
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Table 4 Unconditional and conditional models: summary estimation results  
 
 ϕ κ1 κ2 pi ln(L) χ
2
(25) LR: 
κ1=κ2=0 
LR: 
pi=0 
Unconditional models         
P1  double Poisson - - - - -8866.3 367.6 
.0000 
- - 
P2  bivariate Poisson -1.7847 - - - -8753.4 94.6 
.0000 
- - 
P3  zero-inflated biv.P. -1.5381 - - .0278 -8739.2 64.3 
.0000 
- 30.2 
.0000 
N1  double n.b. - .1231 .0523 - -8841.2 272.1 
.0000 
50.2 
.0000 
- 
N2  bivariate n.b. -1.8915 .1259 .0548 - -8727.9 45.0 
.0084 
52.8 
.0000 
- 
N3  zero-inf. biv .n.b. -1.7317 .1052 .0386 .0151 -8725.5 40.1 
.0287 
27.4 
.0000 
4.8 
.0028 
Conditional models         
P1  double Poisson - - - - -8527.1 232.2 
.0000 
- - 
P2  bivariate Poisson -1.7695 - - - -8441.4 45.5 
.0073 
- - 
P3  zero-inflated biv.P. -1.6795 - - .0097 -8439.6 40.1 
.0285 
- 3.6 
.0128 
N1  double n.b. - .0217 .0000 - -8526.4 229.3 
.0000 
1.4 
.1623 
- 
N2  bivariate n.b. -1.7941 .0278 .0026 - -8440.2 43.5 
.0123 
2.4 
.0912 
- 
N3  zero-inf. biv .n.b. -1.7063 .0191 .0000 .0084 -8439.1 39.7 
.0313 
1.0 
.2095 
2.2 
.0504 
 
Note: ln(L) is the maximised value of the log-likelihood function. 
  
χ2(25) is the chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic, described in Section 3.  
 
LR: κ1=κ2=0 is the LR (likelihood ratio) statistic for a test to compare the negative binomial 
model (N1, N2 or N3) with the corresponding Poisson model (P1, P2 or P3). 
 
LR: pi=0 is the LR statistic for a test to compare the zero-inflated model (P3 or N3) with the 
corresponding non-inflated model (P2 or N2). 
 
p-values for χ2(25) and simulated p-values for the LR statistics are shown in italics. 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics: sample data 
 
 λ1,j λ2,j qj qj(1 – qj) attj sig1,j sig2,j skyj 
Mean 1.4650 2.0451 .6025 .2244 31.7 .8692 .8650 .1695 
Variance 1.7216 2.2657 .0151 .00088 123.4 - - - 
St. dev. 1.3121 1.5052 .1228 .0296 11.1 - - - 
1st quartile 0 1 .5233 .2150 23.0 - - - 
Median 1 2 .6094 .2352 31.2 - - - 
3rd quartile 2 3 .6814 .2458 38.0 - - - 
Minimum 0 0 .1331 .0817 7.7 - - - 
Maximum 10 9 .9103 .2500 67.7 - - - 
No. of 0’s - - - - - 348 359 2209 
No. of 1’s - - - - - 2312 2301 451 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Non-parametric and parametric representations of the relationship between qj 
and ( j,1λˆ , j,2λˆ )   
 
qj 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.62 0.66 0.70 0.74 0.78 
Non-parametric 
j,1λˆ  
1.636 1.699 1.760 1.691 1.504 1.681 1.454 1.426 1.226 1.226 0.674 
j,2λˆ  
1.680 1.803 2.068 1.877 1.936 2.147 2.074 2.181 2.113 1.924 1.993 
Parametric 
j,1λˆ  
1.708 1.735 1.734 1.705 1.651 1.572 1.474 1.359 1.234 1.102 0.969 
j,2λˆ  
1.719 1.823 1.914 1.990 2.049 2.090 2.111 2.112 2.092 2.053 1.995 
 
 
Note:  The non-parametric representation is obtained by estimating (5) and (6) with the covariates qj 
and qj(1 – qj) replaced by ten 0-1 dummy variables for banded values of qj. The values for qj 
shown in the top row are the central values in each band (except for the bottom and top 
bands). The parametric representation is based on the estimated version of (5) and (6) 
reported in Section 5. The values reported are the fitted values of the dependent variable in 
each case, with all other covariates set to their sample mean values. 
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Table 7 Average total disciplinary points awarded per match, by referee 
 
 
Source: The Football Association. 
 
Note:  Referees who officiated at fewer than 30 Premier League matches between the 1996-7 and  
2002-3 seasons (inclusive) are not shown in Table 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Referee Matches 
Disciplinary  
points awarded  Referee Matches 
Disciplinary  
points awarded 
   
Home 
team 
Away 
team 
Total 
    
Home 
team 
Away 
team 
Total 
 
1 Reed 85 1.788 2.753 4.541 15 Bennett 68 1.603 1.853 3.456 
2 Willard 60 1.900 2.350 4.250 16 Barry 117 1.385 2.060 3.444 
3 Barber 147 1.728 2.463 4.190 17 Jones 112 1.411 1.991 3.402 
4 Riley 131 1.626 2.511 4.137 18 Ashby 33 1.212 2.152 3.364 
5 Harris 52 1.750 2.327 4.077 19 Wilkie 81 1.358 1.975 3.333 
6 Knight 41 1.829 2.171 4.000 20 Dunn 136 1.368 1.956 3.324 
7 Styles 56 1.929 2.018 3.946 21 Elleray 129 1.295 1.984 3.279 
8 Rennie 94 1.819 2.096 3.915 22 Winter 143 1.231 1.979 3.210 
9 Dean 54 1.685 2.111 3.796 23 Gallagher 122 1.262 1.918 3.180 
10 Wilkes 30 1.400 2.333 3.733 24 Halsey 74 1.338 1.730 3.068 
11 D'urso 85 1.624 2.094 3.718 25 Alcock 78 1.000 2.026 3.026 
12 Poll 160 1.619 2.069 3.688 26 Wiley 90 1.433 1.578 3.011 
13 Bodenham 44 1.455 2.045 3.500 27 Durkin 145 1.248 1.469 2.717 
14 Lodge 102 1.392 2.108 3.500 28 Burge 57 0.877 1.649 2.526 
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Table 8 Rule changes and changes of interpretation, by season 
 
SEASON RULE CHANGES/CHANGES OF INTERPRETATION 
1996-7 Referees are reminded to severely punish the tackle from behind. 
1997-8 Failure to retreat the required distance at free kicks and delaying the restart of 
play are to be interpreted as yellow card offences.  
1998-9 The tackle from behind which endangers the safety of an opponent is to be 
interpreted as a red card offence. 
The red card offence of denying an opponent a goal scoring opportunity is 
changed to denying an opposing team a goal scoring opportunity (widening 
the scope of this offence).  
1999-2000 Simulation (diving, feigning injury or pretending that an offence has been 
committed) is to be punishable with a yellow card. 
Referees are reminded to punish racist remarks with a red card. Swearing is 
also an offence warranting a red card. 
2000-1 Offensive gestures are to be punishable with a red card. 
2001-2 Some relaxation of the rule requiring referees to issue a yellow card if a 
player celebrates a goal by removing his shirt. However, celebrations that are 
provocative, inciting, ridiculing of opponents or spectators or time wasting 
remain punishable with a yellow card. 
Referees are reminded to punish intentional holding or pulling offences with 
a yellow card.  
2002-3 Referees are reminded to be strict in punishing simulation and the delaying of 
restarts, especially if players remove shirts for any length of time celebrating 
a goal. 
 
Source: Rothmans Football Yearbook (various editions). 
 
 
 
 
Table 9            Average numbers of yellow and red cards and total disciplinary points 
awarded per match, by season 
 
Home team Away team Both teams Season  
Yellow Red Total Yellow Red Total Yellow Red Total 
1996-7 1.305 0.026 1.350 1.808 0.084 1.934 3.113 0.111 3.284 
1997-8 1.303 0.058 1.405 2.016 0.124 2.189 3.318 0.182 3.595 
1998-9 1.582 0.074 1.695 2.147 0.116 2.316 3.729 0.189 4.011 
1999-2000 1.411 0.055 1.497 1.932 0.129 2.118 3.342 0.184 3.616 
2000-1 1.355 0.084 1.487 1.800 0.084 1.921 3.155 0.168 3.408 
2001-2 1.247 0.084 1.389 1.803 0.103 1.955 3.050 0.187 3.345 
2002-3 1.326 0.071 1.432 1.703 0.124 1.882 3.029 0.195 3.313 
 
Source: The Football Association. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
